persönliche identität definition

Now, if we agree with the tentative conclusion that there is, at present, no satisfactory simple view of personal identity, then we assent to the claims that. According to the psychological approach, therefore, they are both identical with X. Eine phänomenologisch-soziologische Untersuchung zur personalen Identität. Premise 2 is implied by the psychological approach. What defines our personality, character, and identity? As a result, most commentators accept 6 but choose to accept a particular criterion in the vicinity of either side of the psychology-physiology divide. WR-INI may entail IM but does not so necessarily: it is conceivable that personal identity relations consist in something which is itself neither identical with nor reducible to a spiritual substance nor identical with nor reducible to aggregates or parts of psychologies and physiologies. It is merely weakly reductive, however, because the identity of the phenomenon that specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity does not itself follow from anything other than itself. 202-29, Unger, Peter (1979), “I Do Not Exist,” in Macdonald ed. The question of whether an authentic reductionism about persons must claim that it is not only able to give a criterion of personal identity without presupposing personal identity but also that facts about persons are describable without using the concept “person” is a matter of current controversy (cf. Jeder Mensch ist einzigartig. Since a fetus does not possess the cognitive capacities necessary to satisfy the demands of the Psychological Criterion, if the latter is true, no person can be identical with a past fetus. The dialectic of such thought experiments, however, requires that a description of the scenario is possible that does not presuppose the identity of the participants in question. One of the main problems a psychological approach faces is overcoming an alleged circularity associated with explicating personal identity relations in terms of psychological notions. Lewis 1976; Noonan 1989; Perry 1972). Borrowed from Medieval Latin identitās (“sameness, identity”) in the 18th century, from Latin īdem (“the same”). This is the upshot of Parfit’s claim that what prudentially matters is psychological continuity: for all we should care, from a purely rational point of view, it is good enough for us to be psychologically continuous with one or more future persons and consequently it would be irrational for us to prefer our own continued existence to death by fission. Let us discuss these theories of personal identity in more detail. These commentators typically reason as follows: suppose that it is indeterminate that X is identical with Y. Behrendt 2003; Cassam 1989; 1992; Johnston 1997; McDowell 1997; Parfit 1984; 1999; forthcoming; cf. Combined with a four-dimensionalist or temporal part ontology, this view is not as absurd as it initially seems, but it is certainly controversial. As a result, since these beings do not possess cognitive capacities, if they do at all, that qualitatively attain those of thinking beings, couching the persistence question in terms of persons entails that none of us has ever been a fetus or infant or ever will be a human vegetable (Olson 1997a; Mackie 1999). Da die persönliche Identität vor allem eine kognitive Leistung der Begriffsbildung ist, spricht man neuerdings auch vom Selbstkonzept. Take memory as an example: suppose that Paul broke the neighbor’s window as a kid, an incident he remembers vividly when he starts working as a primary school teacher in his late 20s. Request full-text PDF. 87-108, McDowell, John (1997), “Reductionism and the First Person,” in Dancy ed. Answers to the persistence question often provide a criterion of personal identity. Shoemaker 1970). Auf der … One of the most influential thought experiments in recent personal identity theory is the case of fission. The significance of some of these may be open to debate, as is whether all are required to meet the definition of an open scholar, but of particular relevance is the presence of 'create' as the first item on the list. (1995), “The Unimportance of Identity,” in Harris ed. Carsten Korfmacher While the formal properties of the concept of identity are necessary constraints on our discussion, the truth of our identity judgments is subject to material conditions of correctness, which these formal properties cannot provide. Ohne ein … Eine Identitätsfeststellung kann durch die Polizei durchgeführt werden und erfolgt meist im Rahmen einer Personen- oder Fahrzeugkontrolle. We must first note that Parfit believes (i) that our persistence consists in physical and/or psychological continuity; (ii) that personal identity is indeterminate in some cases, that is, that sometimes there is no right-or-wrong answer to the question of whether somebody has ceased to exist in the course of a certain adventure (see 3.b. (1995), pp. (1992). Mackie 1999; Olson 1997a; 1997b; Snowdon 1991; 1995; 1996). The system of claim 1 wherein the vehicle data further includes identification codes and priority codes. Derek Parfit proposes a theory of the ontological status of persons, which promises to answer the problem of fission and the paradox of personal identity. Arguably, many respectable philosophical ideologies, such as conceptualism or Neo-Kantianism, may issue in theories of personal identity along Simple lines without appeal to Cartesian Egos. (1997), pp. Conclusion: The physiological approach is true. Hence, many elements of our successful everyday reidentification practices, such as physical appearance, fingerprints, or signatures, are inadequate if considered as constituting ingredients of personal identity relations: for example, if the man in the crowd is wearing a Yankees jacket, this might be sufficient evidence for you to conclude that he is your friend Larry. How do our actions affect our character? Collaborative Dictionary     German-English, You want to reject this entry: please give us your comments (bad translation/definition, duplicate entries...), Free: Learn English, French and other languages, Reverso Documents: translate your documents online, Learn English watching your favourite videos, All German-English translations from our dictionary, Die Musik wird rhythmusorientiert und meine ganz, The music will be rhythmically-oriented and will be my very, Doch diese Erkenntnis verlieren wir, wenn wir zuviel über unsere, Yet we lose this revelation when we worry over much about our. However, given that the paradox obliges us, in one way or other, to revise our pre-philosophical beliefs, a theory of personal identity should aim at meeting what will be referred to as the Adequacy Constraint AC on theories of personal identity, which demands that. Premise 2: Our persistence is determinate. Our alleged intuition: since both Y1 and Y2 share with X all psychological characteristics, both are candidates for being identical with X: either, in the absence of the other, would have been identical with X. soziale Identität, Theorie der Sozialen Identität (SIT = Social Identity Theory), ist innerhalb der kognitiv orientierten Sozialpsychologie die bei weitem prominenteste Theorie der Intergruppenbeziehungen (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). also 2.d.). I.calitativă (specifică), caracter comun pentru două obiecte de gândire distincte distincte în timp și spațiu, care prezintă însă aceleași calități. Many translated example sentences containing "persönliche Angaben" – English-German dictionary and search engine for English translations. Hence, it is implausible to believe that such a borderline exists. The problem with D is that, in conjunction with premises 2, 4, and 5, it reduces the underlying assumption that there can be an informative criterion of personal identity ad absurdum. Rather, the Paradox should be regarded as the starting point of any discussion of personal identity, in the sense that taking a stand on its individual premises bestows the various criteria of personal identity with their distinctive features. On this view, persons have bodies only contingently, not necessarily; so they can live after bodily death. If this human animal has persistence conditions different from those that determine our persistence, then there must be two things wherever each of us is located. Meine persönliche, von anderen Menschen unabhängige Identität ist mir sehr wichtig. Linacre College, Oxford University One popular criterion, associated with Plato, Descartes and a number of world religions, is that persons are immaterial souls or pure egos. Therefore, by modus tollens, if X is not determinately identical with Y, X is not identical with Y (cf. Initially the idea underlying this claim may appear prejudicial; ultimately it is based on a number of widespread but not universally accepted beliefs about the naturalness of the world and the nature, validity and theoretical implications of physicalism. Bermúdez, Jos‚ Luis; Marcel, Anthony & Eilan, Naomi eds. (1979), pp. Can one really become two? while many psychological connections are not. (b) One could deny premise 2 instead, arguing that if personal identity is indeterminate, then our preferred criterion of personal identity does not have to deliver verdicts in all thought-experimental scenarios. Sie notieren Assoziationen zum Begriff „Identität“ und erarbeiten, was transgeschlechtlich bedeutet. Wie lange dieser Prozess dauert, kann von Kultur zu Kultur sehr verschieden sein. (FILOZ.) Google Scholar provides a simple way to broadly search for scholarly literature. Im deutschen Sprachraum taucht „Kulturelle Identität“ häufiger auf als „Soziale Identität“ mit rund 100.000 („Social Identity“: 870.000), „Kollektive Identität“ mit 30.000 („Collective Identity“: 85.000) und „Nationale Identität“ mit gut 250.000 Treffern („National Identity“: 2.700.000). Imagine the brain criterion to be true for human beings. Given that the determinacy and factuality premises are accepted, It is hard to believe that we could: if a hybrid view were determinately true, a human being could die twice, once when her psychological and once when her physiological capacities cease to function. September 2015; Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 63(3) DOI: 10.1515/dzph-2015-0027. Würde, Selbstachtung und persönliche Identität. A third criterion of personal identity is that we are our bodies, that is to say, that personal identity is constituted by some brute physical relation between, for example, different bodies or different life-sustaining systems at different times. Alleged conclusion: either, on pain of violating the transitivity of identity, the Psychological Criterion is false or the question of whether two person-stages X at t1 and Y1 at t2 are temporal parts of the same person depends on facts concerning not only X and Y1 but also, in this case, Y2. 3.a. The denial of premise 3 seems to entail that we have, in a deep sense, an influence on whether we survive a given adventure, namely by possessing a particular normative, experiential, or attitudinal background. How are aspects of identity expressed in different situations? The need for the distinction between authentic and inauthentic reductions arises due to an equivocation that ought not to confuse the present discussion: reductionisms in personal identity theory often take forms, if regarded for example as sets of supervenience claims, that are deemed, in other areas of analytic philosophy, as distinctively non-reductionist. b. According to this general stance, either both psychological and physiological continuity relations are fully reducible to a domain in which physical explanations are couched, perhaps in terms of the basic elements of a final and unified theory of physics, or they belong themselves to such a domain. The question of whether or not physically impossible but logically possible scenarios are acceptable remains to be answered. 1.1 Definition von Stigma; 2 Identität nach Goffman. Although the lump of bronze and the statue itself surely exist, these objects have different persistence conditions: if melted down, Venus ceases to exist while the lump of bronze does not. A, B, C, and D are deductions, and premise 1 is plausible on independent grounds. However, wearing a Yankees jacket is not what it is for Larry to persist through time: neither did Larry come into existence when he wore the jacket for the first time nor does he die when he takes it off. It is doubtful, however, that the indeterminacy of personal identity can be exploited selectively, for physiological and psychological continuity relations are equally indeterminate in a particular range of cases (cf. We could avoid this problem by adding a closest-continuer or best candidate clause, stating roughly that the best candidate for survival in a fission scenario, that is, the fission outcome which bears the most or the most important resemblances to the original person X, is identical with X. This implies that the Big Assumption must either not entail D or be rejected, which can be argued, always assuming that AC is being met, in three ways: (a) One could define “adequacy of modality” in such a way as to exclude precisely those thought experiments which are problematic for a given criterion. The persistence question, the question of what personal identity over time consists in, is literally a question of life and death: answers to it determine, insofar as that is possible, the conditions under which we survive, or cease to exist in the course of, certain adventures. IM is to be distinguished from a more popular version of the simple view, according to which personal identity relations are weakly reductive (WR) and in independence non-informative (INI): WR-INI: X at t1 is identical to Y at t2 iff there is some fact F1 about X at t1, and some fact F2 about Y at t2, and F1 and F2 are irreducible to facts about the subjects’ psychology or physiology, and X at t1 is identical with Y at t2 in virtue of the fact that the propositions stating F1 and F2 differ only insofar as that “X” and “t1” occur in the former where “Y” and “t2” occur in the latter. Although it may be poorly understood, due to limitations of space this article will disregard the view. Premise 5: The distinction between IM and WR–INI on the one hand and the reductionist views sketched in I.A.4 on the other is exclusive. Consider the following thought experiment: X’s brain is transplanted into Y’s body. The Narrow version, we may note, is logically equivalent to the Physical Criterion. United Kingdom, Understanding the Problem of Personal Identity, Reductionism (2): Psychological Approaches, Reductionism (3): Physiological Approaches, Parfit and the Unimportance of Personal Identity. Would we have sufficient reason to believe the brain criterion to be true for members of the tribe in question as well, if we were aware of all facts about their physiologies? : The music will be rhythmically-oriented and will be my very personal identity. Premise 5: Physiological and psychological answers to the persistence question are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. This is the question of personal identity, and it is literally a question of life and death, as the correct answer to it determines which types of changes a person can undergo without ceasing to exist. WR-INI is weakly reductive in the sense that, while the identity relation in question can be reduced to a further domain, the further domain itself typically exhibits elements of non-reducibility and/or resistance to full physical explanation. Note that, should personal identity be indeterminate, we might still be able to give a criterion of personal identity, even though such a criterion would then fall short of giving full necessary and sufficient conditions, since in some imaginary case it does not apply. Epistemicists like Timothy Williamson (cf. In the intermediate cases, X at t1 is approximately halfway psychologically and physiologically continuous with Y at t2. While many commentators regard the appeal to quasi-memory, and ultimately “quasi-psychology,” as sufficient to solve the circularity problem, some commentators think that personal concepts infiltrate extensionally articulated psychological concept-systems so deeply that any reductionist programme in personal identity is doomed from the start (cf. Translate texts with the world's best machine translation technology, developed by the creators of Linguee. Consequently, the objection goes, if memory and other psychological predicates are not impartial with regards to identity judgments, a theory that involves these predicates and that at the same time proposes to explicate such identity judgments is straightforwardly circular: it plainly assumes what it intends to prove. Let us distinguish between numerical identity and qualitative identity (exact similarity): X and Y are numerically identical iff X and Y are one thing rather than two, while X and Y are qualitatively identical iff, for the set of non-relational properties F1…Fn of X, Y only possesses F1…Fn. Alleged conclusion: personal identity is indeterminate. (1970), “The Self and the Future,”, Zimmerman, Dean W. (1998), “Criteria of Identity and the “Identity Mystics”,”. In a search for the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustenance of personal identity relations between subjects, which type of continuity-relations could SF describe? (1997), pp. Identität. We must distinguish between two versions of this view. Identität: Der Begriff der Identität wird im heutigen Sprachgebrauch eher inflationär verwendet- man spricht von Identitätskrise, Identitätsverlust, „corporate identity“ und nicht zuletzt der „identity card“. There are two problems with this proposal: first, it is difficult to see how such a definition of adequacy of modality could not be ad hoc. In fact, however, the opposite is the case: the appeal to physiology introduces an unacceptable element of contingency into the answers to the persistence question envisaged by defenders of these criteria. Nowadays, the Simple View is disparaged as a theory only maintained by thinkers whose religious or spiritual commitments outweigh the reasons that speak against their views on personal identity. This argument may be referred to as the Paradox of Personal Identity. Personal identity theory is the philosophical confrontation with the most ultimate questions of our own existence: who are we, and is there a life after death? The sets of necessary and sufficient conditions determined by these sets of sub-personal facts constitute the various criteria of personal identity. Consider memory as an example. Martin, Raymond & Barresi, John eds. These adventures do not have to be theoretically as fancy as the cases, to be discussed later, of human fission or brain swaps: a theory of personal identity tells us whether we can live through the acquisition of complex cognitive capacities in … [Note: ∀(x, y) is an abbreviation of (∀x)(∀y).]. Blog. A criterion of personal identity tells us what our persistence necessarily consists in, which means that it must be able to deliver a verdict in possible scenarios that is consistent with its verdicts in ordinary cases. (1971b), On “The Importance of Self-Identity”,”, Parfit, Derek A. There is no single problem of personal identity, but rather a widerange of questions that are at best loosely connected. 13-45 (reprinted in Martin & Barresi eds. B: from A, 3: There is a factual relation R between a person X at t1 and a being Y at t0/t2 which, for every possible scenario, determines whether X at t1 is identical with Y at t0/t2. We can further distinguish between three versions of the psychological criterion: the Narrow version demands psychological continuity to be caused “normally,” the Wide version permits any reliable cause, and the Widest version allows any cause to be sufficient to secure psychological continuity (cf. So folgt die rechtliche I… Zurück zur Übersicht. Such a criterion specifies, insofar as that is possible, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the survival of persons. Personal identity, in metaphysics, the problem of the nature of the identity of persons and their persistence through time. Premise 6: Physiological and psychological criteria of personal identity are incompatible, that is, R cannot be a conjunction of physiological and psychological relations as well as issuing in determinate and compatible solutions to each thought experiment. Das Thema ist Identität. From this it follows that. Modern day personal identity theory takes place mainly within reductionist assumptions, concentrating on the relative merits of different criteria of identity and related methodological questions. Lovibond, Sabina & Williams, Stephen G. eds. …the Simple View of personal identity is true. Personal identity theorists, therefore, ought to offer a more comprehensive account of the ontological status of persons and their relation to the constituents that make them up. Two apparently physiological theories of personal identity are at bottom psychological, namely (i) the Brain Criterion, which holds that the spatiotemporal continuity of a single functioning brain constitutes personal identity; and (ii) the Physical Criterion, which holds that, necessarily, the spatiotemporal continuity of that which sustains the continuous psychological life of a human being over time, which is, contingently, a sufficient part of the brain that must remain in order to be the brain of a living person, constitutes personal identity (cf. Einheit 5- persönliche identität 5.1 I can talk about how personality and character define us. The information is sent to a replicator device on Mars, which at t2 creates a qualitatively identical duplicate, Y (cf. There are two main contenders, physiological continuity-relations and psychological continuity-relations, which will be discussed in turn. This suggests that we do not only need a better understanding, and above all more promising articulations, of the Simple View, but also a new taxonomy of theories of personal identity: the traditional division of theories into Simple, Psychological and Physical, even if maintained here by the author of this entry, may not be the best way of viewing the matter. These commentators typically complement their psychological theory with a non-branching proviso and/or a closest continuer clause. It further means, however, that X has two Parfitian survivors, Y1 and Y2, which is, according to Parfit, as good (or even better) than being identical with Y1 and/or Y2. Wie beeinflüssen Sprache und Kultur die Identit ä t?Wie beitragen individuelle Menschen zu … Diesen Satz verwendeten Wissenschaftler bereits im 17. In distinguishing those changes in a person that constitute survival from those changes in a person that constitute death, a criterion of personal identity through time is given. Collect a few possible answers and ask yourself whether the resulting being, the freshly created being that is now a candidate for being identical with you before you died, is in fact you. Does the logic of the concept of identity impose further restraints on the concept of personal identity? 135-48 (revised version of his 1985), Shoemaker, Sydney (1999), “Self, Body, and Coincidence,”. Nagel 1971). Wer bin ich? X’s brain’s corpus callosum, the bundle of fibres responsible for retaining the capacity of information-transfer between the two brain hemispheres, is severed, leaving two (potentially) equipollent brain hemispheres. Identity disturbance means a not fully inte- grated personality identity that is underdeveloped due to the contradicting self- and object repre- sentation of the individual. McDowell 1997; Wittgenstein 1922, 3.263). Jahrhundert. (1971a), “Personal Identity,”, Parfit, Derek A. The other problem is that even if personal identity is indeterminate, the claim cannot by itself establish one criterion over others: in order to do so, it would have to exclude those thought experiments that challenge opposing criteria while leaving untouched those that supposedly establish the preferred criterion. Ich-Identität - eine Definition Die Psychologie ist nicht nur eine interessante Wissenschaft, sie ist mindestens … Das Kollektivverhalten steht für eine unstrukturierte Reaktions- oder Verhaltensweise in einem Kollektiv, die zwar nicht zufällig, aber auch nicht durch soziale Interaktion innerhalb des … Premise 3 seems to be obvious, because its being false would entail that one and the same being can outlive itself, which is absurd. On the assumption that we are unable to hierarchically structure these conflicting intuitions, we have a classical stand-off: there are two sides to the coin of personal identity and appeal to intuition plainly underdetermines preferring one side over the other. (Note that congruence and reflexivity entail that identity is symmetric, “∀(x, y)[(x = y) → (y = x)], and transitive, “∀(x, y, z)[((x = y) & (y = z)) → (x = z)]). Second, memory alone is not necessary for personal identity, as lack of memory through periods of sleep or coma do not obliterate one’s survival of these states. NEWSCHOOL New School, die Sendung von Kindern für Kinder, ist diesmal an der Grundschule am Wilhelmsberg. Premise 3: Psychological continuity cannot at the same time be (i) necessary and/or sufficient for a thing’s persistence and (ii) neither necessary nor sufficient for the same thing’s persistence. Zimmerman 1998): IM: X at t1 is identical to Y at t2 iff X at t1 is identical to Y at t2. Locke 1689, II.xxvii.15; Shoemaker 1963). Nagel 1971) and hemispherectomies too have been performed in the past. Suppose X’s brain to be transplanted into Y’s skull and X’s body and Y’s brain are destroyed. …it could have given a new form or content to your psychology, that is, that it is not necessary or sufficient for the “resurrected you” to remember your actions or experiences and that there do not have to be any causal connections between the actions and experiences of you before you died and the”resurrected you”? 4.1.2 Teilidentitäten und multiple Identitäten 4.1.3 Das Identitätsgefühl Although exact similarity is, by congruence, a necessary condition for synchronic personal identity, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for diachronic personal identity, that is to say, the persistence of a person over time: two person-slices at different times could be qualitatively identical slices of different people or qualitatively distinct slices of the same person. Our alleged intuition: since Y at t2 shares with X at t1 all memories, character traits, and other psychological characteristics, X and Y are identical. While a weakly reductive criterion of personal identity relations is explicable in terms of the identities of phenomena other than persons, the identities of these phenomena themselves are not explicable in other terms: their identity may be, as we would suppose “soul identity” to be, “strict and philosophical”, and not merely “loose and popular” (Butler 1736). Beim Menschen bezeichnet Identität (v. lat. 1988). One makes a judgment of personal identity whenever one says that a person existing at one time is the same as a person existing at another time: e.g., that the president of Consider a test case. Assume, for reductio, that personal identity consists in direct memory connections. While this principle is not necessarily sacrosanct, it is desirable to avoid violating it. Since this conclusion violates the transitivity of identity (which states that if an X is identical with a Y, and the Y is identical with a Z, then the X must be identical with the Z), personal identity relations cannot consist in direct memory connections. (1976), “Lewis, Perry, and What Matters,” in Rorty ed. Definition of identity. Let the underlying assumption be that there is a criterion of personal identity. Appeal to causal and cognitive connections which relate not only memory but other psychological aspects is sufficient to eradicate the problem. Should teletransportation be unreliable, all criteria of personal identity but the Widest version of the Psychological Criterion are false. No, precisely because the brain criterion is true for human beings, a liver criterion would have to be true for members of this tribe. This is not to say, however, that it is ruled out that lack of similarity over time may obliterate numerical personal identity: depending on what personal identity consists in, certain qualitative changes in a person’s psychology or physiology may kill the person.

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